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Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity. By CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009. Pp. xiv + 230. Price £45.00.) 
 
Had Plato written in English, could he have resisted the puns inherent in our word “constitution”? 
In English, a constitution means both a political set-up and an individual’s physical or psychic 
health, and constitution (the verbal noun) is the act of establishing things, including states and 
psyches. What could be more perfect for Plato’s purposes in The Republic—or The Constitution, 
as it would then have been called? 
 
There again, maybe Plato created the pun: maybe our word “constitution” now has both a 
political and a psychical sense because of the deep historical influence of Plato’s city-soul 
analogy (and perhaps also of St Paul’s church-body analogy in I Corinthians 12, which may itself 
display Plato’s influence).  
 
In any case the pun is irresistible to Christine Korsgaard. Indeed this is the second time she has 
used it in a book title: cp. her The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral 
Psychology (OUP 2008), a book whose degree of closeness to the present work at times 
approaches fusion. (Compare, for instance, CA p.63, fn.60, with SC p.71, last paragraph, second 
sentence.) “I am always making the same argument”, says Korsgaard (SC p.76), wryly 
combining self-parody with an enactment of her own thesis that some kinds of homogeneity or 
consistency stand as a necessary condition of practical identity.  
 
Self-Constitution is nonetheless a new monograph, presenting the very latest versions of 
Korsgaard’s central arguments. And it is a truly remarkable achievement, readable, learned, 
humane, and passionate. It is also beautifully written. Above all, it is exciting. Korsgaard is far 
from unscholarly, but—it seems to me—she is not afraid to be thought unscholarly because she 
takes risks that more costive and timid academics might eschew. Good for her.  
 
What Self-Constitution takes further than any of Korsgaard’s previous work is the deployment of 
Platonic and Aristotelian resources to Kantian ends. Chiefly, Korsgaard herself says, she uses 
Aristotle “to explain the sense in which an intentional movement can be attributed to an agent as 
its author”, and Plato “to explain the kind of unity that a person must have to be regarded as the 
author of her movements” (SC xii). But there are other uses too. The book is as much an 
ingenious and novel reading of Plato’s Republic as of Kant’s ethical works. 
 
In one line, the book argues that self-constitution is what agency is all about. The self is an 
achievement of reason, and action according to reason is the means whereby the self is made. 
 
…whenever you choose an action—whenever you take control of your own 
movements—you are constituting yourself as the author of that action, and so you are 
deciding who to be… As a rational being, as a rational agent, you are faced with the task 
of making something of yourself, and you must regard yourself as a success or a failure 
insofar as you succeed or fail at this task. (SC xi-xii) 
  
2 
Action is self-constitution. And accordingly I am going to argue that what makes actions 
good or bad is how well they constitute you. (SC 25)  
 
First question: won’t action on Korsgaard’s conception always be illegitimately self-regarding? 
The commonsense answer to “Why should I give to famine relief?” is “To help the starving”. 
Korsgaard’s answer looks to be “As part of my self-constitution”. Korsgaard may answer that the 
two answers are always both involved—all reasoning is universalising reasoning; every reasoner 
is a Kantian reasoner, whether or not she realises it (81)—and that something goes wrong if either 
is not present. As other Kantians have recently insisted, there is a difference between the formal 
and the substantive characterisation of an action, and there need be no conflict between them. (If 
that seems runic, perhaps it will seem less so after a few more paragraphs.)  
 
Second question: how, if there is only one self, can there be more than one self-constituting 
action? Won’t the first such action leave my self created, and nothing for later actions to do? Or if 
a series of actions cumulatively create a self, won’t the self only be complete when the series is, 
so that judgements about “how well they constitute you”, hence about how good they are, are 
only possible ex post facto?  
 
But what Korsgaard means by “self-constitution” is as much self-maintenance as self-creation. 
Our universal principles “hold us together” (103); formulating and following them can neatly be 
called “pulling yourself together” (125-6, 179), maybe even “getting a life” (see 128-9). Insofar 
as you fail to act on such principles, “you are not one person, but a series, a mere heap, of 
unrelated impulses” (76, cp. 142, 206). By acting rationally a human keeps himself constituted as 
an agent; as long as he lives, self-constitution is an “endless activity” (41). In so doing he 
performs what Aristotle (as Korsgaard reads him) regarded as the human function, in a sense 
analogous to the sense in which a giraffe performs the giraffe’s function—“to be a giraffe, and to 
go on being a giraffe, and to produce other giraffes” (35).  
 
Self-constitution means recognising the “reflective distance” “between the incentive and the 
response” (116); it means choosing to distinguish what you do from what impulses, instincts, and 
appetitions do in you, or through you. It means choosing to act not on whim but on principle. 
Another name for what Korsgaard means by “principle” is “reason, the thing that makes us us” 
(114). For unless you choose to act on principle or reason, there is no you: “In order to be an 
agent, you have to be autonomous… in order to be autonomous, it is essential that your 
movements be caused by you, by you operating as a unit, not by some force that is working in 
you or on you” (213). Thus self-constitution is not something that one action achieves, but 
something that every action should achieve.  
 
This does clarify the issue. But as Korsgaard recognises (83), it might not see the objectors off 
completely. For one thing, a life where you are always in the business of unifying yourself 
sounds quite a strenuous and a high-minded life. Is there no time off, no time to be frivolous? 
Korsgaard’s response can be Kant’s: “Sure, within reason”. (What boundary does reason set 
here? There is a familiar paradox lurking in the idea of gravely deciding to be frivolous. That 
paradox does not arise in practice, of course: in practice we are frivolous without deciding to be, 
simply when we don’t decide not to be. But can the Kantian capture this feature of real life?)  
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For another thing, it is a theme familiar from, e.g., Nussbaum and Williams that it will not always 
be possible, let alone rational, to unify the moral life. Sometimes conflicted is the rational way to 
be. Korsgaard I think must deny this. She might say that the only place such conflicts can come 
from is a diversity of values in the world. Since she rejects the realism that “value in the world” 
implies, she will continue to align rationality and self-unification, rather as Simon Blackburn 
aligns them on the basis of his irrealism. I doubt this move does the trick: again like Blackburn, 
Korsgaard accepts that our experience of value feels like response to value-in-the-world, even if it 
isn’t really (209). So simply rejecting realism will not get her round the fact that our experience 
of value also feels like response to conflicting values in the world. If the way it feels matters—
and Korsgaard clearly thinks it does—the problem of conflict arises for her whether or not she is 
a realist. 
 
It is tempting to put a third difficulty as follows: Mustn’t there be a first occasion on which I act 
on principle? But how did I manage that, when I had never acted on principle before? How, in 
short, does responsibility arise out of non-responsibility?  
 
Tempting though this way of putting it may be, it can’t be right. It is entirely normal for rational 
competences to emerge as we develop, without our knowing exactly when and where they first 
appear. The question “At precisely what time, on exactly what day, were you first able to read?” 
need have no good answer; the ability to read appears gradually, and there is usually nothing 
more precise to say about its appearance than (at most) remarks like “It certainly wasn’t there on 
June 1, and certainly was there on July 1”. If we can allow this vagueness in the acquisition of 
other rational capacities, we can allow it in the acquisition of reason or principle. 
 
Korsgaard does have a developmental story to tell about how we acquire reason, but (to her 
credit) she does not lose sight of this inherent and constitutive vagueness. The title of her sixth 
chapter, “Expulsion from the Garden”, suggests that the form of this story will be frankly 
mythical. However, its real point—for that matter, perhaps the same can be said about the Garden 
of Eden story—is about how humans differ from animals (212-3): 
 
A non-human animal acts on what I called “instinct”. Her instincts are her principles, and 
they constitute her will… by structuring her perceptions [so that] she nearly always 
already knows what to do… You are not so lucky. As a rational agent, you are aware of 
the grounds of your beliefs and actions—or, I should say, the potential grounds. For being 
aware of them gives you some distance from them… Self-consciousness divides you into 
two parts, or three, or [more]… it separates your perceptions from their automatic 
normative force… On the one side, there is the [inclination to run;] on the other side, 
there is the part of you that will make the decision whether to run, and we call that reason. 
Now you are divided into parts, and must pull yourself together by making a choice. And 
in order to make that choice, reason needs a principle—not one imposed on it from 
outside, for it has no reason to accept such a principle, but one that is its own.   
 
Self-consciousness enables us humans, unlike the giraffe, to be aware that we have an impulse to 
run. To be aware that we have this impulse is to be able to be “reflectively distant” from it. 
Reflective distance from the impulse to run makes possible the deliberative question “But should 
I run?”. That question, once raised, demands an answer; it brings with it “the knowledge of good 
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and evil” (Genesis 3.22). But the deliberative question can only be answered by reference to a 
“principle”: that is to say, by reference to a rule for acting in any such case.  
 
Such principles could be imposed on us from outside (heteronomously, as Kantians say), but then 
they would not be our principles. The only remaining possibility is that we should create such 
principles, “autonomously”, for ourselves, to constitute the form of our deliberation on any given 
occasion. But, if I am to overcome the fragmentation created by self-consciousness, the principles 
that I create for myself in this way must be self-unifying principles, principles on which it can be 
truly said that I act, not merely that some force in me acts through me. And only some principles 
can be self-unifying principles. For example, a principle always to act on whatever whim happens 
to seize me at the moment—“particularistic willing”, as Korsgaard calls it (72-6)—leads not to 
psychic unity, but to disintegration. (The Constitution of Agency (59, n.52) gave us the nice 
example of Jeremy the aimless student, who is always halfway through one doing thing when 
another stimulus comes along and he starts doing something else; Korsgaard reuses this at 169.) 
Other ‘principles’ are not really even principles. For example—in this book, Korsgaard’s 
favourite example—it is not just self-stultifying, but actually incoherent, to try to determine 
whether you should tell yourself the truth on pragmatic-utilitarian grounds (182-3): 
 
[If] you undertake to believe, not what is true… but what it is most useful for you to 
believe[, then] you’ve got a problem… before you can allow yourself to believe what is 
true, you have to satisfy yourself that it is most useful for you to believe what is true. But 
you can’t do that without first satisfying yourself that what you think about that—about 
what it is most useful to believe, I mean—is, quite simply, true… So you have to try to 
tell yourself the truth… You can’t treat yourself in accordance with the principle of utility 
while you are thinking. For the principle of utility is a tyranny, while, thought, by its very 
nature, is free. 
Our agency is determined by our principles, and our principles are the principles we choose. But 
choice of principles must be choice of self-unifying principles. And some would-be principles, 
such as Jeremy’s, are self-disintegrating not self-unifying; while others, such as the utilitarian’s 
about truth-telling, fail to be principles at all.     
In the main contours of this argument, Korsgaard takes herself to be expounding both Kant and 
Plato. As she rightly says, the key theme of the Republic is the reunification, into an integrated 
and harmonious whole, of the parts of the soul: parts that only become separate in the “expulsion 
from the garden”, in the moment when self-consciousness makes us see our own desires and 
impulses as something we can stand back from. (The first quotation in the book is Plato’s 
marvellous words from Republic 443d about the just man’s self-harmonising.) She must be right 
too to see this notion of reflective distance as key to Kant’s distinction between reason and 
inclination, and to claim that reason, for Kant, is crucially an organising and harmonising faculty. 
Hence what Kant has to say about reason can be very naturally and fruitfully combined, as she 
combines it, with what Plato’s Republic has to say about justice.  
 
Another sign that her combination of the Republic and Kant is an apt one is this: on her reading, 
the same basic difficulty faces both. This is the intuitive gap between self-constituting action and 
morally good action. If Gauguin walks out on family life to go to Tahiti to paint, he follows the 
imperative to constitute himself according to his own preferred principles, but (apparently) acts 
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immorally; if Gauguin stays with his family, he does the moral thing, but (apparently) misses the 
best way to advance his own self-constitution. For Kant, this is the familiar problem whether the 
principles that the categorical imperative generates—if any—are the same as the principles of 
morality. For Plato, it is the equally familiar problem whether “philosophical justice” is the same 
thing as “vulgar justice”. Korsgaard’s achievement is to shed some light—some light—on both 
puzzles by taking them together.  
 
I say “some light”, because in some cases it seems very clear how Korsgaard might bridge this 
intuitive gap; in other cases, not clear at all. For example, the argument quoted above for the 
incoherence of pragmatism about truth-telling towards yourself is only half of the case made at 
182-3. The other half is about the incoherence of such pragmatism towards others, and the key 
thought that ties the two halves together is “there is really no reason for you to treat yourself any 
differently than anyone else” in respect of truth-telling (182). So if the pragmatic maxim about 
truth is incoherent as applied to me, it must be incoherent as applied to others too.  
 
So the argument will go. I am not endorsing it, nor rejecting it; I am merely saying that I can see 
what it will be. I find this harder to see in the Gauguin case. As above, Gauguin’s choice of Tahiti 
over family life apparently increases his Platonic integrity (as we might call it), but decreases his 
moral integrity. That looks like a proof that Platonic integrity and moral integrity, philosophical 
justice and vulgar justice, are two different things—even if, as perhaps in the case of truth-telling, 
they sometimes coincide.  
 
The Gauguin case is particularly tricky, because in it moral and Platonic integrity, as I have 
called them, actually pull against each other. In Korsgaard’s defence, it might be pointed out that 
in most cases they do not conflict. Jeremy the aimless student illustrates nicely how a lack of 
principle can lead to ineffectuality. You might think that the weakness of Korsgaard’s argument 
here is that wickedness has nothing to do with ineffectuality: that the wicked are typically as 
frighteningly dynamic, as deadly in the effectiveness of their agency, as “good at being persons” 
(xiii)—only in the wrong way—as Plato’s Thrasymachus, or Milton’s Satan, or Shakespeare’s 
Richard III, or The Godfather’s Vito Corleone.  
 
But these are all fictional characters. Turn to real life, and the link between wickedness and 
ineffectuality is far clearer, in even the most supposedly Satanic cases. Someone might 
rhetorically ask, “Was Hitler ineffectual?”, expecting the answer “Of course not” and the collapse 
of Korsgaard’s case. But actually the answer is “Yes”. Hitler didn’t get up till 10, and spent his 
mornings ranting pointlessly at his generals, and his afternoons asleep.1 Nor was Hitler’s deputy 
Himmler much more effective: he had no idea how to run a government or an army, and spent as 
much as he could of his time designing uniforms and medals. In real life, highly effective people 
who are also deeply wicked are actually remarkably rare. The tragedies of history, it seems, 
happen mostly not when effectiveness and wickedness are combined in the same people. Rather 
they happen when, for whatever reason, the efficient and honest people do what the wicked and 
ineffectual ones tell them to. 
 
                                                 
1
  This was certainly how he behaved in his later years. Perhaps he was more effectual in the 1930s—and 
perhaps he was less evil then. (Thanks to Derek Parfit for querying this claim.) 
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But the Gauguin case, to come back to that, is not about wickedness as such; it is about how there 
might be a difference between Platonic and moral integrity. Evidence about what Korsgaard 
might say about the Gauguin case comes principally, within Self-Constitution, from her 
discussion of Parfit’s Russian nobleman (185-6; cp. Parfit, Reasons and Persons 327-8). The 
nobleman is a socialist in youth, a “reactionary” (as Russians like to call conservatives) in old 
age. In his relatively penurious youth he foresees that “he will have different values” when he is 
old and rich. Anticipating this, he now draws up a plan for land emancipation in the future. The 
plan cannot be revoked without his wife’s permission, and he binds her never to give this: he tells 
“his wife that his younger self is his real self, that his ideals are essential to him, and that if he 
loses those ideals she should regard him as… dead [and so] unable to release her from her 
promise” (185).  
 
What does the Russian nobleman have to teach us about self-constitution, hence about moral and 
rational action? That wherever it is possible to delegate responsibility for your future behaviour it 
is also, and a fortiori, possible to take responsibility for it. The wife “is to hold him, by holding 
herself, to giving up the estates. But if she can do this, why can’t he?” (187). Unless the 
nobleman’s agency is radically impaired, e.g. by mental illness, this is a rhetorical question. He 
can. His foreseen future attitudes are not merely matters of prediction for him, as someone else’s 
attitudes might be. They are one of the things that he, now, has to bring within the scope of his 
deliberation now. Instead of just anticipating his older self’s “reactionary” attitudes, he has to 
look into the content of those attitudes: to decide whether they are justified attitudes, and so 
whether it is his future conservative self, or his present socialist self, who is right, and hence the 
self that he really identifies with, not in some imagined future, but right now in the actual 
moment of his deliberation (204). A more perfect illustration of what Korsgaard means by her 
claim that deliberation is necessarily self-unifying, both synchronically and diachronically, would 
be hard to imagine.  
 
A parallel line of reasoning would presumably apply to Gauguin. What stands in the way of his 
deserting his family and going to Tahiti to paint? Though Korsgaard has interesting things to say 
about marriage (186-191), her answer is not necessarily—as the Groundwork’s surely would 
be—just to point out that he promised, on the day of his marriage, to stay with his wife and any 
children there might be. Promises can be made rashly, or on crucially incomplete information, or 
in the grip of youthful (or other) illusions about oneself or others or about “Life”; Korsgaard is 
not a fetishist about promises in the way that some Kant-inspired moralists, and indeed Kant 
himself, sometimes are. Possibly nothing stands in the way of Gauguin’s going to Tahiti. It 
depends which Gauguin Gauguin will decide is the real one, if he gets the decision right: the 
Gauguin who accepts that past marital promise as the expression of his true self, or the Gauguin 
who rejects it as expressing some misunderstanding of what he is trying to “make of himself” 
(xii).  
 
This is what I think Korsgaard might say about Gauguin. I can only apologise if I’ve 
misunderstood her. Misunderstood or not, her argument suggests an extremely appealing and 
interesting way of dealing with such cases. More widely, the general importance in ethics of her 
great theme of self-unification should be clear. Any academic who arrives at his desk in the 
morning to a babel of emails and to-do items pointing him in forty different directions at once is 
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bound to see the crucial link between self-integration and effectiveness in doing what you 
actually want to do: in Kierkegaard’s famous words, “purity of heart is to will one thing”.  
 
My main doubt about such an argument is simply whether it is a Kantian argument. An argument 
about self-expression, self-development, and authenticity, and about the kind of consistency that 
these ideals require, seems at least as much an existentialist argument as a Kantian one. That is 
not necessarily a criticism; perhaps an existentialist argument is what we need. But it is a signal 
that the Kant we are now dealing with, Korsgaard’s Kant, is a very different character from the 
stern, pietistic, moralistic rigorist of the tradition. It is also a signal that the original question, 
whether the ideal of self-constitution lines up with the precepts of morality, remains unanswered. 
One lesson we might draw from Korsgaard’s wonderful book is that in fact the two ideals do not 
line up—and that is just so much the worse for the precepts of morality. 
 
Many other fascinating questions, large and small, are raised by Korsgaard’s wonderful book that 
I cannot discuss here. Among the small questions, I am keen to make time soon to think further 
about what a bad house-builder aims at, if not a house (31-2); also about whether I am alone if 
there is just me and a goldfish in the room, as I certainly am not alone if it’s me and a dog, and 
certainly am alone if it’s me and a daffodil (129). Among the large questions, one to return to is 
the question how far Korsgaard really is from the realism that she so often impugns. She talks in 
her irrealist way as if it would be heteronomy, a kind of idolatry, to live on realist assumptions. 
Yet her own view, simply put, is both that we create values (25, 209) by choosing what to value 
(“making the contingent necessary”, 23); and also that there is basically only one right way to 
make these choices (71-2). Why is that so, if not because the power to self-determine is subject to 
rational constraints which themselves are written into the nature of things? But if there are 
rational constraints written into the nature of things, then realism of some sort is true. If one of 
the things that those rational constraints are written into is the human heart, that is not a refutation 
of realism but an application of it, which will show how autonomy and realism are consistent 
after all. For then moral commands (like God’s commands on the best solution of the Euthyphro 
dilemma) will come not only from within, and not only from outside, but from both places: from 
nowhere and from everywhere.2 
 
 
                                                 
2
  For comments and encouragement, thanks to Michael Brady, Derek Parfit, and Christine Korsgaard herself. 
